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Abstract Abstract Abstract Abstract       
The two-sector endogenous growth model of Rebelo (1991) and Felbermayr (2007) is 
embedded  within  an  asymmetric  two-country  international  trade  and  bargaining 
framework. Starting with a free trade equilibrium, the analysis reveals that: (i) foreign aid 
can increase the total world production of consumption goods due to specialization, raise 
therefore welfare in both countries and place both countries on a Balanced Growth Path 
(BGP); (ii) a trade agreement that is based on bargaining and endogenizes the linkage 
between  foreign  aid  and adoption  of  trade  policies  generates  higher  welfare  for  both 
countries  compared  to  autarky;  (iii)  with  bargaining,  the  richer  country's  welfare 
increases while the poor country's welfare decreases compared to their welfare levels in 
case of free trade, despite the foreign aid transfer from the rich to the poor country.  
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1. Introduction 1. Introduction 1. Introduction 1. Introduction 
In this article we analyze a theoretical model in which two countries bargain over a trade 
agreement. The agreement specifies the size of the foreign aid to be given by a rich 
country  to  a  poorer  one,  and  the  terms  of  the  trade  that  take  place  between  the  two 
countries  after  the  aid  is  given.  The  aid  in  our  analysis  is  given  not  because  of  any 
assumed generosity on the part of the rich country, but because it improves the capital 
allocation  across  the  world  and  raises  total  world  production.  This  world  production 
surplus  enables  the  rich  country,  through  international  trade,  to  raise  its  equilibrium 
consumption  and  welfare  beyond  their  no-aid  levels.  To  ensure  it,  and  to  push 
consumption and welfare as high as possible, the rich country uses a trade agreement to 
condition the aid on favorable terms of trade.  
  An  important  assumption  in  our  model  is  that  international  loan  markets  are 
imperfect.
1  It is due to this assumption that aid can improve the capital allocation across 
the world and raise total world production. We also show how due to this increased world 
production it is possible that the rich country may benefit from giving the aid even if it is 
merely a gift in the sense that after the aid is given the trade between the two countries is 
perfectly free, rather than subject to the stipulations of an agreement. 
  It is possible though, depending on initial conditions and parameter values, that an 
aid given as a gift is not beneficial to the rich country. In that case the aid will be granted 
only if the subsequent international trade is not free but based on a trade agreement the 
terms of which favor the rich country.  
                                                 
1  This  assumption  reflects  both  theoretical  and  empirical  findings.  Bulow  and  Rogoff  (2005)  justify 
theoretically why development banks give grants rather than loans to developing countries. Cohen, Jacquet 
and Reisen (2006) show that bilateral donors have favored grants over loans during the past three decades, 
and that in recent years, this preference has been emulated by multilateral aid agencies as well. 
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  In fact, we show that even when giving the aid as a gift is beneficial to the rich 
country, (compared to a situation of free trade without the aid), it still may be even more 
beneficial for the rich country to enforce a trade agreement on the poor country. The 
reason for that is that in the negotiations over the agreement the rich country can use its 
superior bargaining power which springs from having greater welfare than the poorer 
country in case the negotiations fail.
2 
  The model is based on the two-sector growth model of Rebelo (1991) and on its 
two-country international trade extension developed by Felbermayr (2007). This model 
has several realistic virtues. First, it generates the empirically observed decline over time 
in  the  relative  prices  of  capital  goods  in  terms  of  consumption.
3  Second,  in  the 
equilibrium of this model the developed country exports capital goods and the developing 
one  exports  consumption  goods,  as  is  typically  the  case  in  rich-poor  countries  trade 
relationships.
4  
We  model  these  negotiations  according  to  the  Nash  Bargaining  mechanism 
analyzed in Nash (1950). This axiomatic mechanism alleviates the need to specify the 
procedure and structure of the negotiations. Consequently, it predicts an outcome which 
depends only on feasible allocations of the surplus to be created by the agreement and on 
the consequences of non-agreement. In that sense this Nash bargaining mechanism is 
better  for  our  purposes  than  other  bargaining  mechanisms,  for  example  –  the  non-
cooperative ones of the type studied by Rubinstein (1982). 
                                                 
2 In the  model, the superior bargaining power of the rich country springs  merely  from  having  greater 
welfare than the poorer country in case the negotiations fail. No ad-hoc assumptions, of the type sometimes 
used in the bargaining literature, were used for enhancing this bargaining power. See further discussion of 
this point in sub-section 5.2. 
3 See Cummins and Violante (2002) who calculate a decline of the relative price of capital goods in the 
United Stated at a rate of 3%-4% since 1974.  
4 See the evidence in Felbermayr (2007).  
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The  results  of  this  paper  shed  some  light,  then,  on  how  developed  countries 
manage  to  gain  more  than  developing  countries  from  establishing  bilateral  trade 
relationships, as seem to be indicated by World Trade Organization (WTO) empirical 
evidence.  Computable  general  equilibrium  of  the  outcomes  of  the  Uruguay  Round 
agreements show, for example, a disproportional GDP benefit to developed countries, 
compared to that enjoyed by developing ones (Ackerman, 2005). Furthermore, Stiglitz 
(2002) argues that through the Uruguay Round developed countries have set a lopsided 
division  of  profits  generated  by  globalization  in  their  own  favor,  either  through 
maintaining  agricultural  subsidies  given  to  farmers  in  the  developed  countries,  or  by 
legislating property rights that reflect solely the interests of firms in the developed world. 
Thus, understanding the economic forces behind such agreements can help interpreting 
their outcomes. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 offers a survey of the 
relevant literature on trade agreements and their outcomes. Section 3 sets up the basic 
growth and trade model. Section 4 describes the free trade scenario. Section 5 analyzes 
the bargaining-based trade agreement equilibrium, and section 6 concludes. 
       
2. A survey of the literature  2. A survey of the literature  2. A survey of the literature  2. A survey of the literature        
The  economic  relations  between  developing  and  developed  countries  are  complex  by 
nature. These relations are based mostly on two channels. The first is the transfer of 
resources as a loan or by foreign aid from the developed country to the developing one. 
The second is the cross-country trade between the two countries. These two channels are 
implicitly linked, as developed countries may tie the aid (or loan) to changing the terms  
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of trade in their favor. This enhances the donor country's welfare at the expense of the 
developing country. 
Foreign  aid  affects  welfare  either  through  promoting  trade  or  growth,  or  by 
merely increasing income in the recipient country.
5 The linkage, however, between the 
three aspects - foreign aid, trade and growth - is somewhat vague in the literature.  
Several studies explore the connection between aid and trade.
6 Among them, the 
theoretical ones typically assume that the trade policies of both countries and the size of 
the transfer are exogenous. They also assume, that when foreign aid is tied to some policy 
variables in the recipient country, the tying rule is exogenous, usually tying the aid to the 
poorer  country’s  expenditure  rather  than  to  its  trade  policies.  The  few  articles  who 
abstract  from  such  assumptions  use  static  models,  thus  neglecting  to  consider  the 
resulting  growth  implications  of  the  relationship  between  foreign  aid  and  trade. 
Moreover, these articles study tariff wars rather than trade agreements as a means of 
allocating  surplus.
7  In  contrast,  in  this  article  we  study  a  two-country  growth  model 
where the aid is tied to the trade policies by an agreement between the two countries.  
We focus on bilateral trade agreements signed between a developing country and 
a  developed  one,  akin  to  the  kind  of  regional  bilateral  trade  agreements  that  were 
common during the 1990’s.
8 Both parties to such agreements typically  have to make 
concessions on different issues, including curtailing protectionist policies that were in 
                                                 
5 Sometimes foreign aid might cause a decline in welfare in the recipient country. This phenomenon is the 
well-known ‘transfer paradox’. This paradox is not analyzed in the paper.  
6 For a full survey of the linkage of aid and trade see Suwa-Eisenmann and Verdier (2007). 
7 For a more detailed survey of this strand of the literature see the introduction in Lahiri, Raimondos-
Moller, Wong and Woodland (2002).  
8 For instance, since the early 1990s the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) has established an 
extensive network of contractual free trade relations all over the world, including Singapore, Egypt, Israel, 
Chile,  Mexico,  Croatia,  Colombia  and  Lebanon.  For  more  details  see  http://www.efta.int/content/free-
trade/fta-countries. 
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force prior the agreement. While such agreements have become more important and more 
widespread in recent years, there are still only few theoretical studies that attempted to 
study their general properties. Most of these studies concentrated on how bigger countries 
tend to win tariff wars, and typically employ static models, (e.g, Kennan and Riezman 
(1988)). The ones that do use dynamic models, like Devereux (1997), show that tariff 
wars  reduce  the  world-wide  growth  rates  compared  to  free  trade,  due  to  distortions 
inflicted  by  the  tariffs.  We  examine  in  this  paper  what  are  the  growth  and  welfare 
implications of tying foreign aid to costly trade policies even when such distortions are 
absent.  
Among the properties of trade agreements are the trade policies that each country 
is  to  employ.  It  is  worth  noting  that  these  policies  need  not  affect  trade  directly  by 
affecting the price of commodities (like tariffs and subsidies do). Instead, these policies 
can affect trade indirectly via their direct effect on production. Wade (2003) argues that 
the  agreements  that  arose  from  the  Uruguay  Round  -  TRIPS,  TRIMS  and  GATS  on 
investment, trade in services and property rights respectively - benefit the block of the 
developed  countries  at  the  expense  of  the  block  of  the  developing  countries,  not  by 
affecting  the  relative  price  of  commodities,  but  by  limiting  the  development  tools 
available of the developing countries.  
Multilateral trade agreements can often take resemblance to a bilateral agreement 
between developed and developing countries with conflicting interests (as suggested in 
the last paragraph). Most disputes preventing a new multilateral trade agreement among 
WTO members are between the block of developed countries led by European Union, US 
and Japan, and the block of developing countries led by India, Brazil, China and South  
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Africa. Clearly, the leading developed countries involved are those that also contribute 
most of the foreign aid. Theoretical studies assume that foreign aid is often motivated by 
economic considerations.
9 Hence, it can be argued that for obtaining a comprehensive 
understanding  of  foreign  aid  tied  to  trade  agreements,  trade  negotiations  should  be 
considered along with the developed country's decision to provide foreign aid, as we do 
in the paper.       
       
3. The Basic Model 3. The Basic Model 3. The Basic Model 3. The Basic Model       
Consider a world consisting of two economies, North and South, denoted N and S.
10 Each 
economy has a constant population. A representative agent in each economy seeks to 
maximize the following utility function:       
 


















where  ) (t c
i  is per-capita consumption at economy i at t,  { } S N i , ∈ , ρ and θ are constants 
satisfying  0<ρ<1  and  0<θ<1.  The  agent  has  one  unit  of  labor  which  is  supplied 
inelastically, owns the capital in the economy and continuously rents it to firms.  
The lifetime budget constraint of the representative agent in each economy is 
given by 
                                                 
9While Alesina and Dollar (2000) argue that political rather than economic considerations underlie the aid 
given by developed countries in some cases, other studies, such as Asante (1985) claim that economic 
considerations typically motivate foreign aid. 
10  These  economies  may  be  either  two  countries  or  two  blocks  of  countries,  as  in  the  case  of  WTO 
negotiations. Without any loss of generality, we do not distinguish here between the two options.  
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q  is the relative price of capital in terms of consumption goods in country i at 
time t.  ) (t r
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i  are, respectively, the interest rate, capital and wage in 
country i at time t. 
Each  economy  has  two  competitive  production  sectors,  one  for  consumption 
goods  and  the  other  for  capital  goods.  Consumption  goods  (per  capita)  produced  in 
country i at time t, denoted by  ) (t c
i
P , are given by: 
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C        is the amount of capital employed in producing consumption 
goods in country i at time t and B is a technology productivity factor. The subscript P 
denotes production.       
Capital  goods  are  producible  factors  of  production.  The  total  amount  of  new 
capital goods in country i at time t, is denoted by  ) (t q
i . The country i at time t local 
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where A is a technology productivity factor and  ) (t k
i  is the per-capita amount of capital 
in country i at time t. With capital depreciation rate δ, the capital stock in each country 
evolves through time according to: 
 
(5)    ) ( ) ( ) ( t k t q t k
i i i δ − = & . 
 
In  a  competitive  equilibrium  all  markets  clear  at  each  point  in  time;  firms 
maximize current profits, while the representative household rents labor and capital to 
firms, and chooses consumption so as to maximize the lifetime utility in (1).  
  Throughout the article the growth rates of capital, consumption and the relative 
price  of  capital  in  country  i  at  time  t  shall  be  denoted  by  ( ) t g
i
k ,  ( ) t g
i




The analysis is carried out under the following parametric assumption: 
 
Assumption 1:  δ ρ δ θ α − < < − − A A ) )( 1 ( . 
 
As shall be shown below, the first inequality in Assumption 1 suffices to satisfy 
the transversality condition ensuring that utility is bounded, and the second inequality is 
necessary for positive growth of consumption and capital. 
       
3.1 Autarky Equilibrium 3.1 Autarky Equilibrium 3.1 Autarky Equilibrium 3.1 Autarky Equilibrium       
We start with the case of autarky, to be used as a benchmark for evaluating free trade and 
trade  agreements  outcomes  later  on.  Under  autarky  consumption  and  investment  are  
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based on local production alone, implying  ( ) ( ) t c t c
i
p
i =  and  ( ) ( ) t q t q
i
p
i = . Since this 
case was already analyzed by Rebelo (1991), results are presented here without proof.  
In Equilibrium, profits maximizing firms are indifferent at the margin between 
employing capital for producing consumption and capital goods. That is: 
 
(6)    [ ]
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Each economy experiences no transitional dynamics, and grows along a Balanced 
Growth Path (BGP) in which gk, gc and gp are constants satisfying:  
 







gk ,     k C g g α = ,      gp = - (1 - α)gk. 
 
By Assumption 1 and (7), gk and gc are positive while gp is negative, implying 
consumption and capital grow over time while the relative price of capital falls over time. 
Note that gk, gc and gp are the same in both countries.  
The interest rate is constant over time and is given by: 
 
(8)    P g A r − − = δ . 
 
( ) ( ) t k t k
i i
c / ,  i.e.,  the  share  of  capital  allocated  to  producing  consumption  is 
constant over time and given by: 
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The optimal growth rate is given by:  
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The consumption level path in each country is then given by: 
 
(10)    [ ]
α
γ ) ( ) ( t k B t c i i
A = , 
 
where  the  subscript  A  refers  to  autarky.  The  difference  in  initial  amount  of  capital, 
therefore, manifests itself through the levels of consumption and capital and not via their 
growth rates 
 
4. The Model with Free Trade 4. The Model with Free Trade 4. The Model with Free Trade 4. The Model with Free Trade       
In this section we study the case where the two countries freely trade with one another. 
Specifically we add to the above specified model the assumption that at t=0 the two 
economies unexpectedly start trading with each other and that from that moment on both 
countries  face  the  same  relative  price  between  the  two  goods.  We  also  assume  that 
international capital markets are imperfect and take this assumption to the extremity in 
which  international  lending  and  borrowing  is  impossible.  Since  this  extension  of  the  
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Rebelo (1991) model was already done by Felbermayr (2007), the results in this section 
too are presented without proofs. 
Without trade, the price of capital goods in the North is lower than in the South. 
Therefore, with trade the South imports capital goods, and exports consumption goods.  
At  all  times  the  North  is  producing  both  capital  and  consumption  goods  and 
producers  in  the  North  are  indifferent  at  the  margin  between  producing  capital  and 
consumption goods, implying that equation (6) holds for the North. In contrast, if (and 
only  if)  initially  the  South  is  sufficiently  poorer  that  the  North,  i.e.,  if  ( ) 0
S k   is 
sufficiently smaller than  ( ) 0
N k , then the South specializes in producing consumption 
goods and refrains from producing investment goods. This is the case we focus on from 
here  on.  In  appendix  A  we  show  that  this  case  takes  place  if  and  only  if 
( ) ( ) 0 0 2




The  specialization  starts  at  t=0  and  from  then  on  this  two-country  world 
experiences transitional dynamics towards a balanced growth path in which capital and 
consumption in each country grow at a constant rate. The specialization of the South in 
consumption goods persists throughout these dynamics. The specialization in the South 
implies that the world equilibrium relative price of capital goods satisfies: 
 
(11)    [ ]
1











                                                 
11 Note that  1 2 < −γ
γ  since 0<γ<1.  
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  (11) is an equality only along the BGP, a situation that the world economy, as said 
before, converges to. 
Capital evolves in each economy according to (5). However, in the free trade 
scenario, while goods markets are integrated, international lending and borrowing are 
ruled out by assumption. This implies that the trade balance in each country equals zero 
at all times, i.e., that: 
 






P q − = −  
 
where the FT-subscript represents free trade. In addition, the following clearing market 
condition must hold at all times: 
 
(13)    [ ] [ ]
α α






FT + = + . 
 
4.1. The balanced growth path 4.1. The balanced growth path 4.1. The balanced growth path 4.1. The balanced growth path       
Along the Balance Growth Path (BGP) capital and consumption grow at constant rates in 
both countries. As Felbermayr (2007) shows, (7), (8) and (9) hold on the BGP for both 
countries. The resulting interest rates equality implies equal marginal products of capital, 
so that  ) ( ) ( t k t k
S N
C = . This in turn implies that, as in Autarky, the share of capital 
allocated  to  producing  consumption  goods  in  the  North  is  the  constant  γ,  since 
) ( ), ( t k t k
N S and  ) (t k
N
C  must all grow at the same rate.   
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  The  following  Lemma  establishes  the  productive  efficiency  of  the  BGP,  a 
property that we use in analyzing foreign aid tied to trade policy in a cooperative trade 
agreement. The lemma looks at the different allocations to  ) 0 (
S k and  ) 0 (
N k of a given 
amount of an initial total world capital. As the lemma shows, the allocations that put the 
world on a BGP also maximize the world's total production of consumption goods at each 
point in time.    
 
Lemma 1: For each constant M>0, if  ) 0 (
S k and  ) 0 (
N k satisfy: 
 
(i)  M k k N S = + ) 0 ( ) 0 (  
(ii)  ( ) ( ) 0
2
0






then, for all t≥0, the world-wide consumption,  ( ) ( ) t c t c
S N + , is higher than under any 
other pair of   ) 0 (
S k and  ) 0 (
N k that satisfy (i). 
 
Proof: Along the BGP  ) ( ) ( t k t k
N
C
S = , ensuring equal marginal products of capital in 
producing consumptions across North and South at each point in time. This proves the 
claim given identical and concave production technologies.                         ■  
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5. The Bargaining 5. The Bargaining 5. The Bargaining 5. The Bargaining- - - -Trade Equilibrium Trade Equilibrium Trade Equilibrium Trade Equilibrium       
In the previous section it was shown that if initially South is sufficiently poorer than 
North  then  the  world  is  on  a  dynamic  path  in  which  South  specializes  in  producing 
consumption goods. In this section we show how the two countries can reach a Pareto 
superior outcome by tying foreign aid to trade.  
More specifically, this case where initially South is sufficiently poorer than North 
is characterized by  ) 0 ( ) 0 (
N
C
S k k <  and therefore, due to diminishing marginal product of 
capital in producing consumption goods, foreign aid in the form of a capital transfer from 
the North to the South would increase world-wide consumption without reducing future 
world-wide capital stocks. In this section we first find the optimal size of the aid, and 
then employ the Nash-bargaining mechanism to show how the two countries divide the 
surplus of world production created by this transfer.  
       
5.1 The optimal size of foreign aid 5.1 The optimal size of foreign aid 5.1 The optimal size of foreign aid 5.1 The optimal size of foreign aid       
Let 
N k 0  and 
S k 0  denote the initial pre-transfer values of capital in North and South, and 
let Tk denote the size of the capital transfer. In Appendix A we show how the magnitude 
of Tk needed for locating the world on its BGP is:
 12  
 










= γ . 
 
                                                 
12 Note that if international borrowing and lending are allowed, equation (14) provides the size of the 
equilibrium loan taken by South, assuring equal returns to capital in both countries. The reasons for ruling 
out international B&L were discussed in a previous footnote.  
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Although this transfer maximizes equilibrium total world consumption at each 
point in time – it may not be optimal for the North to give it to the South. To see that, 
consider the case where the transfer is pure aid in the sense that after it is given to the 
South at t=0 the trade that develops is absolutely free. In that case, if 
S k 0  is sufficiently 
small then it is possible that the loss of capital due to the transfer would harm North more 
than the gains from trade would benefit it.  We exemplify this possibility now for the 
extreme case in which 
S k 0 =0. In that case the case of free trade with no aid collides with 
the case of autarky and, based on (10), consumption in the North satisfy:  
 
(15)    ( ) [ ]
α
γ ) ( 0 0 t k B c N N
FT =  
 
In appendix A it is shown that if free trade takes place after the transfer Tk has 
been delivered, then consumption in both countries satisfy:  
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where  ) 0 (
N k and  ) 0 (
S k  are post-transfer initial capital stocks the two countries.  
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Applying (6),  ( ) ( ) 0 0
N
c
S k k = ,  ( ) k
S S T k k + = 0 0 ,  ( ) k
N N T k k − = 0 0  and (14) in 
(16), yields: 
 
(18)    ( ) ( ) [ ]
α
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Thus,  if 
S k 0 =0,  consumption  in  the  North,  if  it  avoids  aid,  is  above  its 
consumption in the case it gives aid if: 
 
(19)    ( ) 0 1 1 2 > − − − γ α α  
 
an inequality that holds when  ( ) 2 ln 1− > γ .  
By continuity, the result that under free trade consumption in the North may be 
better if it refrains from aid holds not just for 
S k 0 =0 but also for a range of strictly 
positive,  yet  sufficiently  small,  values  of 
S k 0 .  Note  also  that  it  was  sufficient  to 
exemplify  it  for  consumption  at  t=0  since  along  the  BGP  consumption  grows  at  a 
constant rate that is independent of 
S k 0  and 
N k 0 . 
  Thus,  the  capital  transfer  coupled  with  free-trade  may  or  may  not  be  Pareto 
improving. If it is, then North is better off even if the capital transfer is given as a gift, 
thus providing a simple, purely economic motivation for giving the aid. However, if the 
transfer  is  not  Pareto  improving,  foreign  aid  and  trade  require  that  the  North  be 
compensated for the loss of capital by some kind of tying rule between aid and trade.  
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These compensating changes in trade policies can take many different forms, including 
tariffs, trade quotas, subsidies, or other policy tools affecting trade indirectly through 
their affect on production. We do not specifically model any of these policy concessions. 
Instead, we assume that these compensating trade arrangements can be represented by a 
welfare transfer from South to North. This allows us to use the bargaining mechanism as 
a solution concept for analyzing how can the North be compensated for the economic 
cost of giving foreign aid, without invoking non-economic (e.g. political) justifications. 
While the role of non-economic considerations is obvious and can be considerable, we 
want in this paper to examine how far purely economic considerations can go towards 
explaining observed ties between aid and trade policies.        
       
5.2 The Bargaining Setup 5.2 The Bargaining Setup 5.2 The Bargaining Setup 5.2 The Bargaining Setup       
Both countries have mutual interest in reaching an agreement, because foreign aid in the 
form of capital transfer creates a surplus of consumption without changing the growth 
rate. However, their interests are not identical, since each country desires a larger portion 
of the surplus.  
For  that  purpose  we  employ  the  Nash  (1950)  axiomatic  bargaining  approach. 
There  are  four  axioms  the  Nash  bargaining  solution  must  satisfy.  Specifically,  the 
solution  must  be  invariant  to  affine  transformation,  Pareto  efficient;  symmetric  and 
independent of irrelevant alternatives. Note, that our utility function is independent of 
affine  transformations.  It  also  satisfies  the  axiom  of  the  independency  of  irrelevant 
alternatives. In order to satisfy the other two assumptions, we must assume the following 
assumptions, (see Chan (1988)):  
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Assumption 2 The two countries have full information about the preferences of their 
trading partners. 
 
This assumption implies that the bargaining solution is Pareto efficient.  
 
Assumption 3 Negotiators from each country have the same bargaining skill.  
 
With this assumption and the fact that along the BGP the interest rates in both 
countries are equal, the bargaining solution should be symmetric in the sense that if the 
two countries are identical, their equilibrium payoffs are the same.  
Following Nash (1950), since the bargaining problem satisfies these four axioms 
– it has a unique solution which is the solution to the following problem: 
 
(20)    ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] { }
S S S N N N
c c
S N U c U U c U Max Arg c c
S N




    s.t. 
 
(21)    ( )
α S S N k B c c 2 = + , 
 
where c
i represents the consumption level in country i at time 0 resulting from the Nash 
bargaining mechanism and 
i U  is the utility obtained by the representative consumer of  
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country i in case of disagreement. U
i is a function of the c
i i.e, the country i time 0 
consumption alone, since the relevant equilibrium is along a BGP. 
S k is the post-transfer 
capital in the South at t=0. 
The disagreement point in the model is the autarky payoffs for several reasons. 
First, we rely on the Shapley version of the Nash solution, where the disagreement point 
reflects  the  credible  destructive  power  of  each  player,  and  therefore  we  use  the 
disagreement point as the minimal guaranteed payoffs to each country. Another reason 
for choosing this disagreement point is the endogenous tying rule of aid to trade policies. 
Consider the following scenario: The North and the South negotiate over agreeable trade 
policies and aid in the form of capital transfer from North to South. Both countries know 
that compared to autarky, agreement will improve their welfare. The North can condition 
the capital transfer on the bargaining outcome. If the bargaining process fails, the North 
will not give the capital transfer, and both countries will continue on their autarkic BGP. 
Therefore, the disagreement point is the utilities under autarkic scenario. 
Alternative disagreement points, such as the free-trade allocation without transfer, 
are not credible. In such a scenario each country may impose tariffs unilaterally in an 
attempt to extract welfare from the other country. Kennan and Riezman (1988) showed 
how big countries win tariff wars. Hence, the free trade is not a credible disagreement 
point.  
The  disagreement  points  based  on  Johnson’s  Nash-Cournot  tariff  equilibrium, 
(see Mayer (1981) and Riezman (1982)), is a possible threat point. However, it may not 
be robust if other commercial policies (like quotas) are involved. Therefore, in order to 
generalize the solution to any commercial policies, we find the payoff in the autarky  
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scenario more suitable. Since our analysis is valid either for bargaining over tariff rates or 
other trade policies (such as direct transfers from the South to the North in terms of 
consumption  goods),  the  Nash-Cournot  tariff  equilibrium  cannot  be  used  as  the 
disagreement point. 
Notice also that, relative to South, North has greater bargaining power merely due 
to having a better disagreement point in case the negotiations fail, and that no ad-hoc 
assumptions magnifying this basic power are used.
13 
       
5.3 The Bargaining 5.3 The Bargaining 5.3 The Bargaining 5.3 The Bargaining- - - -Trade Outcome Trade Outcome Trade Outcome Trade Outcome       
Proposition 1 Both countries are better off in equilibrium with trade and bargaining than 
in autarky, regardless of initial capital endowments. 
 
Proof: The total production of consumption goods after the capital transfer is made is 
higher than in autarky, as Lemma 1 shows. This implies that the pair of autarky values of 
South and North consumption is feasible, and therefore the Nash product is positive. The 
Nash product given by equation (20) is positive if both countries are either better or 
worse off with trade. Since the utility functions are strictly increasing, both countries are 
better off at the solution ( ) ) 0 ( ), 0 (
* * S N c c  than they are in autarky .               ■ 
 
While proposition 1 provides a possible motivation for trade agreement if North 
conditions the aid on a suitable trade agreement, it does not shed any light on whether the 
                                                 
13  The  general  form  of  the  Nash  Product  is  ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ]
S S S N N N U c U U c U − ⋅ −
β
,  where  β  represents 
bargaining power. Here we assume β=1 implying that the superior bargaining power of the North springs 
merely from 
S N U U >  and not also from β >1.  
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two  countries  prefer  that  trade  agreement  over  free-trade.  Proposition  2  resolves  this 
issue. 
       
Proposition 2: For some initial capital endowments, North is better off (and the South is 
worse off) under bargaining over trade and aid than under free-trade. 
 
Proof:  Maximizing  the  Nash  product  given  by  (20)  implies  the  following  first  order 
condition: 
 
(22)    ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] 0
1 1 1 1
= − − −








N c  and 
i
A c are consumption levels under agreement (if achieved)  and autarky in 
country i at t=0, respectively. 
Using the constraint  ( )
α S N S k B c c 2 = + it is possible to define the LHS of (22) 
as the function:  
.  
(23)            ( )
N N N k k c N 0 0 , ,  
          






 − − − − −




N S N S N
A
N N c c k B c k B c c c . 
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Note that 
N k 0  and 
S k 0 manifest themselves in this function through 
N
A c , 
S
A c  by 
(10)  and  through 







= γ .  Thus, 
( )
N N N k k c N 0 0 ,  is strictly increasing in 
N c .  We now show that this function is negative 
when evaluated at the free trade allocation, implying that the argument that maximizes 
the Nash product is larger than the consumption level of the North under free trade. 
The solution to the Nash maximization problem in (20) has the property that a 
player's outcome improves with his own disagreement outcome, and decreases with his 
opponent's disagreement outcome. Consequently, since the function  ) (• N  is continuous, 
if  the  proposition  holds  when  0 = k T ,  then  it  is  also true  for  some  neighborhood  of 
strictly positive capital transfers.  
From equation (14) we know that when  0 = k T ,  
 
(24)   







From (11), (16) and the result that along the BGP  S N
C k k =  it follows that the 
consumption levels under free trade when  0 = k T  satisfy: 
 
(25)    ( ) ( ) [ ] γ α
α
− + = 1 1
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(26)    ( ) ( ) [ ] γ α
α
− − = 1 1 S S k B c . 
 
Substituting  (10),  (24),  (25),  (26)  and  x≡1-γ  into  the  function  ) (• N   and 
simplifying yields: 
 
(27)    ( )=
N c N ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 1 1 1 2
θ α θ θ α θ α
α α α
− − − − + + + − x x x x x k B
S . 
 
The RHS of (27) is negative if and only if the term in square brackets is negative, 
which we prove in appendix B.                       ■ 
 
Proposition  2  shows  that  when  0 = k T ,  the  bargaining  outcome  makes  North 
better off, and South worse off compared to free trade without aid. We now show that 
North is better off and South is worse off compared to free trade with aid when  0 > k T . 
 
Proposition 3: North is better off (and South is worse off) under bargaining over trade 
and aid than under free-trade with aid. 
 
Proof:  Equation (18) provides the consumption level in North in case it gives aid to 
South. Differentiating it according to  S k0 , we receive: 
 






















FT k k B
k
c .  
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Thus, for any given  N k0 , the smaller  S k0 , the lower  N
FT c . To show that the lower 







c .  Thus,  the  positive  gap 
N
FT
N c c − *  widens as  S k0  decreases, i.e., as Tk  becomes strictly positive.           ■    
 
Propositions  2  and  3  imply  that  for  some  capital  endowments  if  the  North 
conditions the capital transfer in imposing trade policies that are in its favor, it may gain 
from it more than it could in free trade. In such cases, foreign aid to poor countries may 
improve their welfare, but first and foremost it benefits the richer countries. Since this is 
known to both countries, we can assume that the rich country prefers trade negotiations 
over  free  trade  and  predict  that  in  such  cases  trade  agreements  are  the  preferred 
mechanism for regulating trade between North and South, as is often observed. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 6. Concluding Remarks 6. Concluding Remarks 6. Concluding Remarks       
In this paper we construct a dynamic growth model that combines international trade and 
foreign aid. We evaluate welfare in the donor and the recipient countries, and argue that 
foreign  aid  need  not  affect  growth  rates  in  either  country.  We  also  argue  that  the 
consumption levels do change due to the foreign aid. The foreign aid in the paper is tied 
to international trade policies.  
The paper suggests that while free trade is best to the developing country, it may 
not be so for the developed one. As a result, by endogenizing the tie rule of the foreign 
aid to international trade policies through a bargaining mechanism, welfare is transferred  
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from the developing country to the developed one, via trade agreements which are 'good' 
for the developed country. While these trade agreements make both countries better off 
compared to autarky; for some initial capital endowments these agreements also make the 
developed country better off compared to free-trade. This implies, of course, that while 
the developing country prefers free trade to a trade agreement, it would still be better off 
under  the  trade  agreement  than  under  autarky,  and  thus  a  trade  agreement  is  still 
acceptable.  
Although  we  do  not  model  explicitly  the  trade  policies  over  which  countries 
bargain, we do show that there exist welfare transfers, reflecting direct resource transfers, 
subsidies or tariffs, which can then tie foreign aid to trade policies.  
This result sheds some light over current negotiations between developed and 
developing countries, (in the context of the Doha Round), and the present stalemate in 
these talks. According to its proponents, the last round of negotiations aims to make trade 
fairer  for  the  developing  countries,
14  and  it  is  frequently  referred  as  “The  Doha 
Developing Round”. This round and its failure in Cancun, Mexico (2003), and later again 
in Geneva (2008) was  partly  attributed to the  wide  gaps between the  developed  and 
developing countries. Furthermore, most computable general equilibrium measures of the 
forecasted outcomes of the Doha Round show not only low gains on the aggregate, but 
also skewed outcomes towards developed countries (Ackerman, 2005). Since the round 
has not been terminated we cannot predict its ultimate conclusions. We can forecast in 
light  of  our  analysis,  that  if  an  agreement  is  eventually  obtained,  it  will  favor  the 
developed  countries  rather  than  the  developing  ones,  despite  declared  goals  to  the 
contrary of these talks. 
                                                 
14 For more details, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doha_Round#cite_note-7.  
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Appendix A Appendix A Appendix A Appendix A       
The lifetime budget constraint of the representative agent in each economy is given by 
(2). Notice that since along the BGP  ) ( ) ( t k t k
S N
C = , wages in both countries are equal and 
given by  [ ]
α
α ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( t k B t w
S − = . It is straightforward that wages grow along the BGP at 
the same rate as consumption. Hence, the lifetime budget constraint in each country can 
be written as: 
 
(A1)   
( ) ( ) ∫ ∫
∞ ∞
− − ⋅ − + ⋅ = ⋅
0 0
) 0 ( ) 1 ( ) 0 ( ) 0 ( ) 0 ( dt e Bk k P dt e c
t r g S i
q
t r g i
FT









gk , hence: 
 
(A2)   
( )
( )( )
( ) ( )
( )( ) ρ δ θ α
θ α θ α













− − − ∞
−
A












Substituting (A2) into (A1) and calculating  ) 0 (
N
FT c and  ) 0 (
S
FT c  yields (16) and (17).  
At t=0 South gets a capital transfer from North. As a result, the relative price of 
capital satisfies the following condition: 
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Notice that  ) 0 ( ) 0 ( ) 0 ( 0 k
N N T k k − =  and  ) 0 ( ) 0 ( ) 0 ( 0 k
S S T k k + = . Substituting these 
expressions  into  (16)  and  (17)  and  the  latter  expressions  with  (A3)  into  the  clearing 
market condition (13) implies (14). 
 
Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix B  B  B  B       
In this appendix we complete the proof of Proposition 2  by showing that: 
 
(B1)    F(x) ≡ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 1 1 1 1 2
) 1 ( ) 1 ( < − − + + + −
− − θ α θ θ α θ α α α x x x x x , 
 
for  each  set  of  values  for  (x,  α,  θ)  in  the  relevant  range.  Recall  that  each  of  these 
parameters must be in the interval (0, 1). The proof is based on showing that  ( ) 0 0 = F , 
( ) 0 0 ' = F  and  ( ) 0 " < x F  for all 0<x<1. 
  ( ) 0 0 = F  follows directly from (B1). Differentiating F(x) and simplifying yields: 
 
(B2)    ( )
α
x F '
 =   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 1 1 ) 1 ( 1 1 2
− − − − + + − − + + −
θ α θ θ α θ α θ α θ x x x x  
                 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 1 1 ) 1 ( 1 1
− − − − − − − − − − −
θ α θ θ α θ α θ α θ x x x x . 
 
  ( ) 0 0 ' = F   follows  directly  from  (B2).  Differentiating  the  LHS  of  (B2)  and 
simplifying yields, after tedious, yet straightforward, arithmetics: 
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(B3)    ( )
( )( ) θ α α − − 1 1
" x F
 =  ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
) 1 ( 2 2
2 2





















<  ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
) 1 ( 2 2
2





















<  ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
) 1 ( 2 2
2





















        = 
( ) ( )
θ θ α θ θ α α α
− − − − − − −
−
+





 < 0       
 
where the three inequalities are based on α , θ  and x  being within the interval (0, 1). 
This establishes  ( ) 0 " < x F  which completes the proof 
       
Appendix C Appendix C Appendix C Appendix C       
In  this  appendix  we  complete  the  proof  of  Proposition  3  by  showing  that  c
N,  the 
consumption of the North at t=0 under a trade agreement, is a decreasing function of 
S k 0 .  
  Due to (22) and (23): 
 
(C1)    ( )
N N N k k c N 0 0 , ,  = 0, 
 
which defines c
N as an implicit function of  
S k 0  and 
N k 0 . Simplifying  (23) yields:  
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 (C2)          ( )
S N N k k c N 0 0 , ,  =  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( )
θ θ α α θ θ − −





N S S N
A
N N c c k B k B c c c  
 
Differentiating (C2), bearing in mind the BGP property of  ( )
S N S k k k 0 0 2 + =
γ  and 
also that 
S
A c  is a function of 
S k 0  through (10), yields: 
 




k k c N
0
0 0 , ,
∂
∂
=  ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( )
θ α θ α α
γ α θ αγ
− − − −
− + −




S N S S c k B c k B k B  
              ( ) [ ] ( )( ) ( ) γ α θ








N S k B c c k B  
 
  Substituting  ( )
N S c k B −
α
2  by c
S, which follows from (21), and noticing that 
S S k k 0 >  because the South imports capital from North, leads to: 
 




k k c N
0





( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) [ ]
θ θ θ θ
α θ θ
αγ − − −


















− + + −


















 = 0 
 
where the second inequality follows from the result that 
S S
A c c <  shown in lemma 1.  
This leads to: 
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which holds because the numerator is positive by (23) and the denominator is positive, as  
follows immediately from (23) 
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